perfection, which the Divine goodness would else have imparted to them.' ' Notwithstanding which, mind, that is, God, is said also by Plato to rule over necessity, because those evils, occasioned by the necessity of imperfect beings, are over-ruled by the Divine art, wisdom, and providence, for good; Typhon and Arimanius (if we may use that language) being, as it were, outwitted by Osiris and Oromasdes, and the worst of all evils made, in spite of their own nature, to contribute subserviently to the good and perfection of the whole ;

KCUTOVTO ^tsyiorrjc *re^yng ayaOoTroiuv* ***ra fcafca, and this***

must needs be acknowledged to be the greatest art of all, to be able to bonify evils, or tincture them with good. —

And now we have made it to appear (as we conceive) that Plutarch had no sufficient grounds to /impute this opinion, of two active perceptive principles in the world (one the cause of good, and the other of evil) to Plato. And as for the other Greek philosophers, his pretences to make them assertors of the same doctrine seem to be yet. more slight and frivolous. For he concludes o;[e] nuflfty*- the * Pythagoreans to have held two such substantial principles of good and evil, merely because they sometimes

and

where admit- the contrarieties and conjugations of things, such as finite and infinite, dex-[trous] and siiiistroas, even and odd, and

[Ari]?[tot] JJf the like. As also, that Heraclitus en-

tapnys. MS. •. .

P. 218. tertamed the same opinion, because he

spake of TraAtvrpoTfoe *apfjiovia* /cocr^uov, a versatile harmony of the world,— ^whereby things reciprocate forwards and backwards, as when a